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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
By

BERNARD SCHWARTZ*

One of the significant developments in the field of labor law in
recent years has been the enactment of so-called "curb labor" legislation in many states.' Among these have been statutes providing for
the compulsory arbitration of labor disputes arising in public
utilities.!
Schemes for compulsory arbitration, although bitterly attacked
by labor, amount to more than mere restrictions upon labor unions.
In effect, they constitute an attempt by the State to remove industrial
relations from the arena of "self-help" and to subject them to settlement by legal processes. If other disputes can be settled by law, why
not labor disputes? "Why are labor-management disputes any different from landlord-tenant disputes except that the issues are bigger,
more people are involved, and the economic security of the nation is
"
endangered? 3
Strong arguments can thus be asserted in favor of compulsory arbitration schemes, such as those mentioned above. One should, however, recognize that such schemes must first clear substantial constitutional hurdles, for it can be claimed that they contravene certain
fundamental constitutional limitations.
The chief constitutional limitations which may apply to compulsory statutes may be classified as (1) those imposed by the
provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment as to "due process
of law", and (2) those imposed by the provisions of the Thirteenth
Amendment as to involuntary servitude. 4 We shall seek, in this paper,
to examine the grounds of constitutional attack which can be made
* B. B. S. City College of New York; LL. B. New York University; LL. M. Harvard; Ph.D. Cambridge; Assistant Professor of Law, New York University Law
School, Member New York Bar.
I These are well summarized in Sutherland, The Constitutionality of the TaftHartley Law', I IND. and LABOR REL. REv. 177 196-205 (1948).
- E.g., Florida, Laws of 1947, c. 23, §§1-19; Indiana, Laws of 1947, c. 341, §W1-18;
Mas.. Laws of 1947, c. 596; Michigan, Public Act No. 318, 1947- Mo. Laws 1947,
House Bill 180; Nebraska, L. B. 537, Laws of 1947- New Jersey, Laws of 1946, c. 38,
as amended by Laws of 1947, c. 47 and 75; Pennsylvania, Act 485, Acts of 1947"
Wisconsin. Laws of 1947, c. 414.
-'Senator Ferguson, quoted in Cahill, Do We Need Labor Courts? 31 MARQ. L.
Rrv. 1, 25 (1947).
' See Siinp~on, ConstitutionalLimitations on Compulsory Industrial Arbitration,
38 H 5RV. L. Rrv. 753, 759 (1925).
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against such statutes. Our inquiry does not bear, except perhaps
inferentially, upon the issue of the desirability of compulsory arbitration schemes. Whether such schemes should be set up by the legislature is, of course, a question which is a highly controversial one. A
clarification of the constitutional point is, however, necessary before
the question of desirability can be dealt with in earnest. "There is
little to be gamed in weighing the policy considerations involved in,
and the mechanical details of, setting up a system of compulsory
settlement of labor disputes, if all efforts along those lines would
surely be wasted through an adverse court decision."5
I. From the point of view of the employerOne must start with the general proposition that the policy of our
law is strongly in favor of voluntary as opposed to compulsory, arbitration. As stated by the New York court, "No one is under a duty to
resort to arbitration unless by clear language he has so agreed."" In
line with this view, it has been held that a court cannot impose upon
litigants submission to arbitration,- and statutory provisions for compulsory arbitration have likewise been held invalid. 8 Exceptions have,
however, been made to this principle. One often mentioned occurs
in public contract cases, where provision can be made for arbitration
or decision by a designated public official; 9 here it is said, the exception derives from the contract itself. Another claimed exception
occurs m connection with the exercise of the power of eminent domain,
where property is to be taken for public use in connection with which
statutes have provided that certain facts shall be ascertained by a
proceeding on the pattern of arbitrationO
If statutes providing for schemes of compulsory arbitration are
to be sustained, their validity must derive from the exercise of the
police power of the state. As defined by the Supreme Court, such
to prescribe regulations to
police power includes the authority "
promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the
"Williams, The Compulsory Settlement of Contract Negotation Labor Disputes,
27 Tax. L. Rtv. 587 619 (1949).
o Pound, C. J., in Lehman v. Ostrovsky, 190 N. E. 208, 209 (N. Y. 1931). See
Goethe Kirch Co. v. Holding Co., 176 AtI. 902 (N. H. 1935).
Sobey v. Thomas, 37 Wis. 568 (1875).
St. Louis, 1. M. & S. Ry. v. Williams, 5 S. W 883 (Ark. 1887); In re Bill Relating to Arbitration, 21 Pac. 474 (Colo. 1886); People v. Haws, 37 Barb. 440 (N. Y.
1862); Cutler v. Richley, 25 Atl. 96 (Pa. 1892).
E.g., Philadelphia Housing Authority v. Turner Const. Co., 23 A. 2d 4126
(Pa. 1942).
1 E.g., North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U. S. 276 (1925). See
Ui'DEGRAFF AND MCCoY, ARBITRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES (1916) 11. Compare Stevenson v. King, 10 S.2d 825 (Ala. 1942).
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people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the state,
develop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity-1" Under
this broad definition "in other words, it is the power of a state to do
whatever it deems necessary or desirable for the general welfare-the
general good-of its people."i' It seems obvious that such broad generalizations on the police power (and the cases abound with them)
get us nowhere in this discussion. The scope and limitations-if anyof the police power of the states as exerted with reference to the subject matter of our inquiry can best be determined from an analysis
of specific cases.
First and most significant among these are the Supreme Court
decisions arising out of the Kansas Industrial Court Act of 1920, which,
until recently, was the only legislative attempt in this country to establish a system of compulsory arbitration. It is clear from those decisions
that statutory provisions for compulsory arbitration may involve a
denial of due process in at least some cases. Yet it is important to
bear in mind just what the Supreme Court did and what it did not
decide in those cases.

In the first case, Wolff Packing Co. v Court of Industrial Relaorder of the Kansas Industrial Court which required an

tions.':i
an

employer in the meat-packing industry to pay the increase of wages
determined upon by that court was declared unconstitutional on the
ground of unjustifiable interference with the contract protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment. In the second Wolff case,i- the provisions of the Kansas Act were likewise held invalid in so far as they
authorized the compulsory fixing of the hours of labor, and a similar
conclusion was later reached on the validity of the Act as applied to
the coal mining industry I- In other words, all that the Court held in
these cases was that a system for the compulsory fixing of wages and
hours (one should note that the other features of the Kansas compulsory arbitration scheme were never passed upon by the Supreme
Court) could not validly be set up for the meat-packing and coal
mining industries.
In the first Wolff case, Mr. Chief justice Taft felt called upon to distinguish Wil.son v New,ia where the Supreme Court had upheld an
11 Barbier

v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27 31 (1885).

'-'Keefer, Has a Person the Constitutional Right to Abstain from Work, 29

W. VA. L. Q.
'262 U.
267 U.
'Dorchy
1213 U.

20, 28 (1922).
S. 522 (1923).
S. 552 (1925).
%.Kansas, 264 U. S. 286 (192-1).
S. 332 (1917).
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Act of Congress 1 fixing the wages and hours of railroad employees
engaged in interstate commerce, which had been strongly relied upon
by the Kansas Supreme Court. The following differences between
the Wolff and Wilson cases were mentioned in the course of the
opinion: (1) The Adamson Act was passed to meet a grave national
emergency-i.e., the threat of a national railway strike; there was no
such emergency in the case of the Kansas Act. (2) Congress itself
prescribed the wages and hours fixed in the Adamson Act; under the
Kansas Act, they were left to be determined by an administrative
agency (3) The Adamson Act applied to an industry over which
the state has long had regulatory power; no such power has existed
in the case of packing plants. (4) Railroads owe continuous service
to the public; packing plants do not."' "The minutely detailed supervision, including that of their relations to their employees, to which
the railroads of the country have been gradually subjected by Congress through its power over interstate commerce, furmshes no
precedent for regulation of the business of the plaintiff in error, whose
classification as public is at the best doubtful.""'
The Kansas statute had declared that the manufacture of food
stuffs and clothing, the production of fuel, and public utilities and
common carriers were businesses affected with a public interest. Tis,
in Professor Powell's phrase, "evoked from Mr. Chief Justice Taft an
essay on the demarcation of the class of business affected with a
public interest," 20 some of which is especially relevant for our purposes.
"Businesses said to be clothed with a public interest justifying some
public regulation," asserted the Chief Justice, "may be divided into
three classes:
"(1) Those who are carried on under the authority of a public
grant of privileges which either expressly or impliedly imposes the
affirmative duty of rendering a public service demanded by any member of the public. Such are the railroads, other common carriers and
public utilities.
"(2) Certain occupations regarded as exceptional, the public interest attaching to which, recognized from earliest times, has survived
the period of arbitrary laws by Parliament or colonial legislatures for
regulating all trades and callings. Such are those of the keepers of
inns, cabs, and gristmills.
1739 Stat. 721 (1916).
'sSee Gagliardo, The Kansas Industrial Court, 192 (1941).
s Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S. at 543.
2 The Supreme Court and State Police Power, 18 VA. L. REV. 379, 381 (1932).
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"(3) Businesses which, though not public at their inception, may
be fairly said to have risen to be such and have become subject on
consequence to some government regulation. They have come to
hold such a peculiar relation to the public that this is superimposed
upon them. In the language of the cases, the owner, by devoting his
business to the public use, in effect grants the public an interest in
that use and subjects himself to public regulation to the extent of
that interest although the property continues to belong to its private
21
owner and to be entitled to protection accordingly
As expressed in this classification, the key to the validity of any
system of compulsory arbitration is to be found in the nature of the
industry to which it is made applicable. Implicit in Chief Justice
Taft's opinion in the first Wolff case is the assumption that compulsory
arbitration of the type provided for in the Kansas Act would be upheld if limited to the first class of the Court's classification cited above.
"'The first group consists of industries now clearly recognized as public utilities; the right -of the state to obtrude its will into their affairs
is beyond dispute."2 It can thus be claimed that the Wolff doctrine
does not extend to statutes providing for compulsory arbitration in the
public utility field, and practically all writers on the subject have, indeed, asserted that such statutes would not be subject to constitu23
tional attack.
The argument in support of the assertion that statutes providing
for compulsory arbitration in public utilities would be valid would
go as follows: Public utilities, as stated above, appear in the Court's
first class of industries subject to governmental regulation, and are
consequently clearly among those affected with a public interest. The
Court's discussion of this classification sets up an implication that it
would uphold compulsory arbitration in them; and this implication
is reinforced by the Court's discussion of Wilson v New. Aside from
the national emergency, the main ground of distinction between that
case and the Wolff decision lies in the differences in the natures of
"1262 U.

S. at 535.
= Hamilton, Iffectation with Public Interest. 39 YALE L. J. 1089, 1101 (1930).
1See, e.g., Abernethy and Ingrassia. Compulsory Arbitration of Labor Disputes
in Public Utilities, 13 ALB. L. Rrx. 20. 24 (1949): Cummins and DeVyver, THE.
LABOR PROBLLM IN FHi UN nD STATis (1947) 476; Gagliardo, op. cit. supra note 18,
at 216: Millis & Montgomery, Organized Labor (1945) 827- Stein, LABOR PROBLE S IN
AM[RtCA

(19-17) 646; Taylor,

LABOR PROBLEMS AND LABOR LAW

(1944) 577- Berman,

The Supreme Court and Comnpulsory Arbitration, 18 Am. Eco. REV. 19 (1928); Hamilton, .supra. note 22; Rabinowitz, The Kansas Industrial Court Act, 12 CALIF. L. RE".
1. 9 (1923): Simpson. supra, note 4, at 776: Smith and Delancey, The State Legislatures and Unionism, 38 MicH. L. REG. 987, 1031 (1940). The only writer holding
the other way seems to be Mason, The Right to Strike, 77 PA. L. REV. 52, 69 (1928).
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the industries involved. 24 "The act [i.e., in Wilson v New] was sustamed primarily on the ground that it was a regulation of a business
charged with a public mterest."2 5
In addition, compulsory arbitration in the utility field would be
more readily sustained by the courts as a proper exercise of the police
power because of the general tradition of regulation of public utilities.
have long been held to be businesses affected
"Public utilities
public
interest
and
therefore subject to special regulations by
with a
the State beyond that imposed on private industry generally" 2 Labor
disputes in the field of public utilities and transportation "if not
remedied, would leave the public helpless, the whole people ruined,
and all the homes of the land submitted to a danger of the most serious character. 2 7 And, as recently stated by Chief Justice Vanderbilt,
"Where by reason of a strike, work stoppage or lockout the flow of
the services of any of these essentials of community life is halted or
impaired, the state has not only the right but a pressing duty to step
in and prevent the continuance of such stoppage or impairment and
to take appropriate measures to restore them. If instead of a stoppage
or curtailment of essential services there is an emininent danger of
their being halted or curtailed, the State has the right as well as the
obligation of preventing the occurrence of any such catastrophe."28
Legislation providing for compulsory arbitration would thus seem
clearly valid at least as applied to public utilities. Such utilities
"supply services of vital importance to the public. In most cases the
individual utility companies enjoy local monopoly, so that a strike in
a particular locality will deprive the public of that locality of the
services provided by the utility A utility company has a duty of continuous operation. It is certainly neither arbitrary nor unreasonable
to impose on the employees of such a company a duty not to quit
work in concert, but to allow their disputes to be settled by compulsory arbitration. In such a case the legislature may well say, as
Mr. Justice McKenna said in Wilson v. New that:
submission to regulation is the condition which
attaches to one who enters into or accepts employment m a business
in which the public has an interest.' "

Would compulsory arbitration legislation be valid, however, in
view of the Wolff cases, if applied to other than public utilities? PerGagliardo, op. cit. supra note 18, at 195.
-5
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 551 (1923).
"State v. Traffic Telephone Workers' Federation, 66A 2d 616, 621 (N. J. 1949).
"Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. at 351.
"*State v. Traffic Telephone Workers' Federation, 66A. 2d 616, 621 (N. J. 1949).
" Supra, note 4, at 775-6.
2Paraphrasing
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haps the chief factor which had influenced the Court in the Wolff
cases was the interference by the state with liberty of contract. This,
said the Court, was the essential vice of the Kansas Act. "It curtails
the right of the employer on the one hand and of the employees on
the other, to contract about his affairs. This is part of the liberty of
the individual protected by the guarantee of the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment." 30 Today, "although the constitutionally protected liberty of contract is far from its Gotterdammerung,
its ascendancy has been challenged by cases upholding minimum
wage and maximum hour legislation."3i The Court has thus, since
West Coast Hotel Co. v Parrish,"' abandoned the basis upon which it
invalidated the Kansas Act, namely, that the provisions authorizing
the Kansas Industrial Court to fix wages and hours in the meatpacking and coal-mining industries constituted an undue infringement
of the liberty of contract. "Since our decision in West Coast Co. v
Parrish
, it is no longer open to question that the fixing of a
minimum wage is within the legislative power and that the bare fact
of its exercise is not a denial of due process
under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Nor is it any longer open to question that it is within
the legislative power to fix minimum hours."33 In the words of one
commentator, "now that the States, and the United States Government too
may by statute prescribe minimum wages, why may
they not adjust them through the procedures of compulsory ar34
bitration?"
Another factor bearing upon governmental power here is the
recent tendency of the Supreme Court to abandon the "affected with
a public interest" formula as the fulcrum upon which regulation of
industry must hinge. It will be recalled that in the Wolff and Dorchy
cases the Supreme Court held that the industries involved were not so
"clbthed with a public interest" as to be subject to a scheme of compulsory fixing of wages and hours. In the more recent decisions, this
type of analysis is gotten away from. Indeed, in Nebbia v New
York,-, the "public interest" rubric is all but abandoned. "The phrase
'affected with a public interest,"' Mr. Justice Roberts asserts, "can,
m
the nature of things, mean no more than that an industry, for adequate
262 U S. at 534.
zi Smith and DeLancey, loc. cit. supra note 22.
300 U. S. 379 (1937).
• United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 125 (1941). See Lincoln Union v.
Northwestern Co., 335 U. S. 525, 536 (1949).
' Ross, The Constitutiontl History of Industrial Arbitration in Australia, 80
MiN,,. L. REv. 1, 15 (1945). A similar question is asked in Cahill, supra note 3, at 13.
z'291 U. S. 502 (1934).
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reason, is subject to control for the public good" 3 -which tends to
make Chief Justice Taft's classification in the first Wolff case somewhat superfluous. "So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the absence of other constitutional restriction, a state
is free to adopt whatever ceonomic policy may reasonably be deemed
to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation
adapted to its purpose.
If the laws passed are seen to have a
reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are
satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court
functus offlcio.'7
Under the above analysis, schemes for compulsory arbitartion,
even if applied beyond the public utility field, are now immune from
due process attacks by employers of industries which may be affected.
"The due process clause is no longer to be so broadly construed that
the Congress and state legislatures are put in a strait jacket when
they attempt to suppress business and industrial conditions which
they regard as offensive to the public welfare."""
II. From the point of mew of the employee:
Schemes for compulsory arbitration usually contain provisions prohibiting the exercise of the power to strike. It can be argued that
such provisions violate the rights secured to employees under the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. It is important, first of all,
to realize that the Supreme Court, in the cases arising under the
Kansas Industrial Court Act of 1920, did not pass upon the constitutionality of that Act's prohibition against strikes. We thus do not
have even the limited precedents which the Wolff and Dorchy cases
afforded us in our discussion of the employer's claim that he is deprived of due process by compulsory arbitration.
Labor has often urged that prohibitions of strikes, such as are
contained in compulsory arbitration statutes, result in involuntary
servitude other than as a punishment for crime, and that legislation
prohibiting strikes is consequently unconstitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment. It seems clear, however, that "the prohibition
of strikes, provided the right of the individual worker to quit the employment is preserved, is not at all the sort of thing at which the
Thirteenth Amendment was aimed." 39 At most, that amendment
31291 U. S. at 536.
291 U. S. at 537.
Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U. S. 525, 536 (1949).
-"Simpson, supra note 4, at 784.
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means nothing more than the right of the individual employee to quit
work. "The right to strike is the right to quit work in concert by
agreement, and thns certainly the Thirteenth Amendment does not
cover." 40 That Amendment only prohibits forced labor, and to prohibit the use of the strike weapon is not to force anyone to labor.
One should mention parenthetically that even the constitutional
prohibition does not prevent forced labor in all cases. The Thirteenth
Amendment "was adopted with reference to conditions existing since
the foundation of our Government, and the term involuntary servitude
was intended to cover those forms of compulsory labor akin to African
slavery which in practical operation would tend to produce like
undesirable results. It introduced no novel doctrine with respect of
services always treated as exceptional, and certainly was not intended
to interdict enforcement of those duties which an individual owes to
the State, such as service in the army, militia, on the jury, etc." 41 Nor
does the power of a court of equity to compel the specific performance
42
of personal service contracts infringe the constitutional prohibition.
The contention that a statutory proscription of strikes imposes
involuntary servitude was answered by the Colorado court in a leading case involving a statute prohibiting strikes during investigations
by that state's Industrial Commission:
"There is no involuntary servitude under this act. Any
individual workman may quit at will for any reason or no reason.
There is not even prohibition of strikes. The only thing forbidden
is a strike before or dunng the commission s action."

This reasoning, it should be noted, can be applied with equal
force to compulsory arbitration laws containing a complete prohibition of strikes, for, even in such cases, "What is
prohibited is
the instigation of calling or leading a strike, and no puishment is
provided for the individual who decides not to work, whether singly
or in concert with others." 44 Such an argument was in fact used by
the Kansas court in upholding the prohibition of strikes in that state's
Industrial Court Act (and it should be emphasized that on this aspect
of its opinion it was not reversed by the United States Supreme Court)
"It is said the act of 1920 is void because it trenches on

personal liberty. The personal liberty contended for its liberty to
leave the employer's service. All the leading cases in which the
"Lee, The Thirteenth Amendment and the General Railway Strike, 4 VA. L.
Rav. 437, 439 (1917).
41 Butler v. Perry, 240 U. S. 328, 332 (1916).
'In re Lennon, 166 U. S. 548 (1897).
People v. United Mine Workers, 201 Pac. 54, 56 (1921).

"Local 170 v. Gadola, 34 N. W 2d 71, 76 (Mich. 1948).
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principle involved have been discussed are cited. It is not necessary
to review them. The statute expressly guards the privilege of any
employee to quit his employment at any time. He may quit before
controversy arises, when controversy arises, while controversy is raging, and after controversy has been adjusted.""'

This type of reasoning, while probably sufficient as a matter of
law to answer the involuntary servitude argument, is somewhat unreal economically
Granted that the individual's right to leave his
job is protected, that right may not be worth much if he is forbidden
to cease work en masse with other members of his union. Labor is
thus deprived of a valuable right, notwithstanding the fact that the
individual employee is free to quit at any time. As stated by Chief
Justice Taft in the first Wolff case: "A laborer dissatisfied with his
wages is permitted to quit, but he may not agree with his fellows to
quit or combine with others to induce them to quit
while the
worker is not required to work at the wages fixed, he is forbidden on
penalty of fine or imprisonment, to strike against them and thus is
compelled to give up that means of putting himself on an equality
with his employer which action in concert with his fellows gives
him."

46

As far as the employees are concerned, their individual freedom
to leave their jobs may be quite illusory, if their right to act in concert is taken away from them. This is conceded even by the Kansas
court which upheld the Industrial Court Act: "It may be argued that
a laboring man is not compelled to work for any particular employer,
and that the laboring man can quit at any time and go elsewhere. So
far as the law is concerned, this is true-he has an absolute right to
and seek work in some other place; but actually, and in fact, it is often
impossible for a working man to quit the work in which he is engaged
and readily find other work. Economic conditions are such that,
most of the time, when a working man finds himself out of work, he
must remain out of work for days, weeks, and months, during which
47
time he and his family suffer."
Yet, valid though such arguments may be from an economic point
of view, they do not bear upon the question of whether statutory
prohibitions against strikes, m connection with schemes of compulsory
45
State v. Howat, 109 Kans. 376, 416 (1921). See, similarly, State v. Traffic
Telephone Workers' Federation, 66 A. 2d 616, 624 (N. J. 1949). Similar answers
have been made to the contention that injunctions against strikes are at odds with
the prohibition against involuntary servitude. See Delornie v. Int. Bartenders'
Union, 139 P 2d 618 (Wash. 1943); Teller, Focal Problems in American Labor Laie
28 VA. L. REV. 727 754 (1942).
"1262 U. S. at 534, 540.
17 Court of Industrial Relations v. Packing Co., II
Kans. 501, 507 (1922).
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arbitration, violate the Thirteenth Amendment. In so far as they show
that such prohibitions substantiallv prejudice the economic interests
of labor, it may be contended that they run counter to the guaranties
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the first place, it can be argued that statutory prohibitions
against the right to strike, which are applicable only to employees in
certain industries, deny to such employees "the equal protection of
the laws." Such legislation, it may be claimed, unjustly discriminates
against these employees, for they are deprived of a substantial right
which is possessed by all other employees.
A statute does not, however, deny "the equal protection of the
laws" merely because it is applicable to one group within the community and not to others. The constitutional guaranty has never
been held to deny the discretion of a state in the selection of classes
to which its legislation is to be applicable.4 8 The power of classification which may be exerted in the legislation of the states has a very
broad range; and a classification is not invalid under the equal protection provision because of simple inequality 49 As Mr. Justice
Brewer has aptly stated. "The very idea of classification is that of
inequality so that it goes without saying that the fact of inequality
in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality "0
The test in determining whether or not a statute denies "the equal
protection of the laws" is thus not one of discrimination s&mpliciter
"The constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the laws is interposed against discriminations that are entirely arbitrary,":," and classifications by the state are not arbitrary so long as there is a reasonable
basis for such classifications. "2 Now can it be said that the classification in a statute of the type we are considering, which singles out
employees in certain industries where the legislature feels that compulsory settlement of labor disputes is necessary, is arbitrary and
without any reasonable basis?
The answer to this question depends upon the industries to which
such statute is applicable. If the industries concerned are of great
importance to the community and cessations in their operation would
have widespread effects upon the economic system, then there surely
is a rational basis for the legislative classification. This is especially
"Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U. S. 26 (1913).
"'International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U. S. 199 (1914).
"Atchison. T & S. F R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 106 (1899).
. Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553, 566 (1931).
'Watson v. Maryland, 218 U. S. 173 (1910).
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true where the statutory scheme is applicable only to public utilities,
for public utilities have always been considered in a class by themselves as particularly subject to the state's regulatory power. "The
legislature may properly classify public utility employees as a group
apart from other employees and enact laws that directly touch them
5 3
but not other employees."
It can also be contended that schemes for compulsory arbitration
deny employees due process, for they unduly interfere with their
freedom of contract. Thus, the Supreme Court assailed the Kansas
Industrial Court Act in the first Wolff case on the ground that "It curtails the rights of the employer on the one hand and of the employee
on the other, to contract about his affairs."i4 We have already discussed this aspect from the point of view of the employer, and basically similar considerations arise where- a like claim is made by the
employees.
More difficult to dispose of is the assertion by labor that prohibitions of strikes, such as are contained in compulsory arbitration statutes, infringe upon the constitutional guaranty of free speech. Reliance is placed upon the series of cases beginning with Mr. Justice
Brandeis' famous dictum in the Senn case that "Members of a union
might, without special statutory authorization by a state, make known
the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by
the Federal Constitution."' ' 7
One can, of course, assert in answer to this that the prohibition of
strikes does not per se involve the prohibition of all peaceful picketing,
and hence does not violate the constitutional right. This, indeed, was

the approach of Pecora, J. in Society of New York Hospital v
Hanson,5 where a strike inimical to the public interest was enjoined
on the ground that "the public cannot brook any interference with
the activities of an institution on which it relies for the treatment of
the sick and hurt. A stoppage of electric current, a delay in deliveries
of vital supplies, or any number of readily conceivable difficulties
created by a strike might result in loss of life. The necessity of avoidmg such tragic consequences to the public clearly outweighs the
sound general policy favoring the protection of labor's right to
strike."5 7 But continues the learned judge, "It does not follow, merely

'State

v. Traffic Telephone Workers' Fed., 61 A. 2d 570, 574 (N. J. Ch. 1948).

r4262 U. S. at 534.
6' Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U. S. 468, 478 (1937).
"185 Misc. 937 (1945).
"7185 Misc. at 943.
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because the court will enjoin a strike, that peaceful picketing should
also be prohibited."-,
One must, however, admit that this dichotomy between strikes
and picketing (that a prohibition of strikes does not necessarily inelude a proscription of picketing) seems somewhat forced. As Justice
Pecora himself concedes, "striking and picketing are usually concomitants in the public mmd."59
Yet, even granting that prohibitions against strikes, such as those
in compulsory arbitration statutes of the type we are considering, include activities such as picketing, it does not automatically follow that
such statutes constitute an undue interference with labor's right of
free speech. It is important to realize that, except for American Federation of Labor v Swing,"0 the language of the Supreme Court in
holding that picketing comes within the guaranty of free speech, has
been more limited than is often supposed. Thus, in Thornhill v
Alabama, the Court was careful to observe that "the rights of employers and employees to conduct their economic affairs and to compete with others for a share in the products of industry are subject
to modification or qualification in the interests of the society in which
62
they exist.""' The statute and ordinance in the Thornhill and Carlson
cases were held invalid because of their "sweeping and inexact
terms;"m1 they could be interpreted so as to proscribe all picketing.
Thus, "all that has been decided by the present court is that if a state
provides no method for the solution of labor disputes except trial by
battle, it cannot wholly forbid one of the combatants to state its case
in what is likely to be the only practicable manner-by means of
placards carried by pickets."'14 One should also note that the "picketing and free speech" cases (aside from the Thornhill case) do not deal
directly with the power of a state legislature as expressed in a statute.
It has, indeed, been asserted that the Court niight uphold restraints
on picketing contained in statutes, while it would deny a similar resrtaining power to exist in courts.Oi
Mr. Justice Jackson in the Wohl case

6

definitely implies that the

" 185 Misc. at 944. See, similarly, State v. Traffic Tel. Workers' Fed., 61 A. 2d
571, 575 (N. J. Ch. 1948).
1"185 Misc. at 945. See Hotel & Restaurant Employees' Alliance v. Greenwood,
30 S. 2d 696, 701 (Ala. 1947).
'312 U. S. 321 (1941).
61310 U. S. 88, 103 (1940).
-'Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. 106 (1940).
'-1310 U. S. at 112.
Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent, 56 HARV. L. REv. 513, 519 (1943).
Teller, Picketing and Free Speech, 56 HARv. L. REv. 180, 216 (1943).
Bakery and Pastry Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769 (1942).
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injunction by the New York court would have been sustained had the

Court found that the enjoined picketing was for an unlawful objective.
"A state is not required to tolerate in all places and all circumstances
even peaceful picketing by an mdividual," 7 and the concurring
opinion indicates that, under the majority's test, it is the state wnch
is allowed to draw the line of lawfulness-to set apart a particular
enterprise and free it from all picketing.s
This is also the view of the Massachusetts court, which asserts
that picketing to compel an unlawful act does not come within the
constitutional guaranty "We are of opinion that none of the cases
relied upon by the defendants
is authority for any principle
that picketing by workmen in concert to persuade or induce an employer to do an unlawful act, one condemned by statute as an unfair
labor practice and contrary to the defined public policy of the Commonwealth and of the nation, is permissible under the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech or otherwise." 9
The argument that prohibitions of strikes, such as are contained
in compulsory arbitration statutes, are invalid because they infringe
upon free speech would consequently seem to get us nowhere.
Clearly, as Mr. Justice Brandeis asserted, "neither the common law nor
the Fourteenth Amendment confers the absolute right to strike."7 0 And,
even assuming that picketing involves the exercise of free speech, that
does not mean that it is not subject to any regulation. "That the State
has power to regulate labor unions with a view to protecting the
hardly to be doubted."7i Whether a prohibipublic interest is
tion of strikes and picketing such as we are considering would constitute an infringement of the rights of employees under the Fourteenth Amendment should depend on the extent to which the public
interest is threatened by the dispute and the reasonableness of the
system provided by the state as a substitute for collective labor
activity 72 Our anlysis above indicates that the constitutional right
of free speech does not extend to picketing carried on for an unlawful
objective. We are thus back to the question of the state's authority
to prohibit this type of strike, for if the prohibition by the state is valid,
any picketing will be for an unlawful objective. Hence, the problem
is one of the exercise of the police power of the state. If the police
6315 U. S. at 775.
3%15U. S. at 777.
R. H. White Co. v. Murphy, 38 N. E. 2d 685, 691 (1942).
Fisheries v. Pimentel, 78 N. E. 2d 93, 96 (Mass. 1948).
11Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 306, 311 (1926).
71Thomas v. Collins, 32S U. S. 516, 532 (1945).
7- See Note, 59 HARv. L. Rpv. 1002, 1003 (1946).
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power has been validly exerted, the free speech argument can readily
be disposed of.

The above analysis indicates that statutes providing for compulsory
arbitration could successfully meet the constitutional test. This conclusion is borne out by the judicial reception of some of the state
public utility compulsory arbitration statutes. It is true that the
Michigan and New Jersey statutes were declared invalid, 73 but the
courts did not deal with the constitutionality of the compulsory arbitration scheme itself. The Mihigan act was struck down on the
ground that it imposed non-judicial duties on a judge by providing
that the chairman of the arbitration board be a circuit judge. The
New Jersey statute was held invalid because it did not contain adequate standards to guide the board of arbitration m the exercise of
the power delegated to them. But both courts expressly stated that
the compulsory arbitration scheme would have been valid, had the
above technical objections been met.
The question of policy-i.e., the desirability of compulsory arbitration-is, of course, quite another matter, as was indicated at the
begining of this paper. Insofar as the question of constitutionality
is concerned, however, we are left with the conclusion of Chief justice Bushell:
there is left but little room for the view that
state
legislation substituting even compulsory arbitration for economic
constitutes an arbitrary and unreasonable inter'trial by battle'
ference with the liberty of the individuals concerned or the property
74
rights of employer and employee."
I Local 170 v. Gadola, 34 N. W 2d 71 (Mich. 1948); State v. Traffic Telephone
Workers Federation, 66 A. 2d 616 (N. J. 1949). See United Gas, Coke & Chemical
Workers % Employment Relations Board, 17 U. S. L. Week 2332 (Wis. Cir. Ct.,
1918). upholding the Wisconsin statute.
1 Local 170 v. Gadola, 34 N. W 2d at 76.

